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PUBLIC S W I C S 7AGILITnr>j 
OPTIMAL PRODUCTION ATIO FACTOR UTILIZATION 
Robert Jo TJhitacre 
ABSTRACT 
Optimality conditions are derived for organizations 
operating under socialistic principles. The analysis includes 
the possibilities of advertising, joint factors of production, 
and demand interdependence for the spectrum of facilities 
provided in the public service,, Operational aspects of a public 
versus a profit maximizing enterprise are contrasted and the 
difficulties in attaining efficiency of operation examined. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic systems in western economies typically have 
two distinct sectors, a public or government sector and a private, 
capitalist sector. While the latter has received significant 
attention in both theoretical and empirical research this is not true 
of the former sector. A theoretical structure encompassing the 
goals and objectives of public service facilities reflecting supply 
and demand conditions for these services is lacking for the socialistic 
sector. 
This analysis formalizes such a theoretical structure 
Overall budgetary allocation for various categories of public 
services is normally a political process and this is taken into 
account. 
Section 2 considers the economic problem facing public 
service facilities from an analytic viewpoint.-while Section 3 
discusses the resultant optimality conditions derived in Section 2. 
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2. Theoretical Analysis of Public Service Facilities 
2.1) Introduction 
In modern societies many services are allocated through some 
centralized governmental authority which may be either local or national 
in scope. Examples include public health facilities, public education, 
police protectionj•road works, park facilities and postal services. 
A purview of such economic goods which may fall within the range of 
possible health services alone are quite diverse; encompassing the 
various family planning services, public health education, maternal 
health care services, immunization programs, emergency treatments, 
geriatric care, etc. Since monetary resources for the total funding 
of such projects must necessarily be limited an obvious question arises 
as to how best to allocate funds to the various competing programs as 
well as what factor content should be utilized. 
Complicating features of a multiple service program are the 
existence of joint factors of production and the possibility of 
advertising for the various services offerred. 
Most public service facilities have the characteristic that 
there is an overall administrative organization coordinating the 
activities of several or many services. This is true for as small a 
microeconomic unit as a hospital, where administrative functions such 
as admittance and discharging, purchasing billing, filing, etc. are 
normally centrally located and commonly utlized by the personnel of 
all of the individual service facilities. Also it is true of such 
a macroeconomic unit as a nationally coordinated family planning program. 
Overall administrative functions coordinate the various factor 
flows and services directly reaching the recipients. The existence 
of joint factors of production arises in that such administrative 
functions cannot be assigned exclusively to one service or another 
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(e.g., as/in assigning costs of administration proportional to 
specific service expenditures or output value as the organisational 
format is not of such a one to one nature. 
The advantage of advertising one or more of the services 
offered is that demand can possibly be influenced so that overall 
effectiveness of the program can be increased. The question then 
arises as to what is the optimal amount of advertising. 
2.2) A Two-service Model 
We consider first the case when there are only two types of 
services offered." Denote these services by X and X- respectively. 
It is presumed that the administrating authority has some overall 
functional evaluation of such services, denoted by h(X ,X2) where 
M X ^ X ^ ) is strictly convex in X1 and X9 with h^h^O. That is, : 
marginal utility is positive but incrementally decreasing at all levels 
2 of output for both services. 
Supply of each service requires productive • inputs. 
Specifically there exist administrative, factors consisting of capital 
and labor, denoted by B and B. , which are joint to both services, 
1. In relationship to the Kenyan context the author is 
currently evaluating the Family Planning and Maternal Health Care 
Programmes for the Ministry of Health, Research and Evaluation Unit. 
This particular model being part of the theoretical foundation of 
this research-. 
2. .Differentiability of all functions utilized in this 
analysis is assumed throughout. 
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factors consisting of capital and labor, denoted by K. for 
i = 1,2, and advertising costs specific to each service, 
A^ for i=ls2. Therefore it is assumed that the relationship 
between productive outputs (public services) and factor inputs are 
expressed by production functions, denoted by 
2.2.1) X. = f.(K.,L., A., B , Bt) for i=l,2. i i i i l k L 
The usual assumption of strict convexity with respect" to 
the arguments of these production functions is made here with 
the exception of advertising. Advertising cannot be expected to 
increase output in and of itself so 
3 -F i = 0 for i=l,2. 
9 A. l 
If we consider the service outlets as representing 
a market it is reasonable to presume that a supply and 
demand analysis is applicable. As such equations (2.2.1) represent 
the supply functions. If for each level of advertising expenditures 
people potentially serviced by the facility are rank ordered 
according to their willingness to pay for the alternative services 
demand curves can be constructed as 
2.2.2) X. = d. (P.,A.) for i=l,2; here P. stands for price of i l i' l 3 - i r 
service i. It is assumed that advertising has a positive impact.upon 
3d. 
demand, > 0 while by construction the demand curve; will 
o n . i 3d necessarily be downward sloping, i <0. It is additionally 
3P. 3 
assumed that d. for i=l,2 are both strictly convex. Construction of 
demand curves in this manner does not preclude the possibility of a 
IDS%> 24S 
negative equilibrium price. The usual definitional switchover of a 
used turning into a supplier cf a good utilized in most economic 
analysis is not applicable in a service industry, particularly those 
in the health services where typically a doctor treats a patient. Thus 
a negative price, i.e. a subsidy, is plausible. 
The administrative authority must take into account the 
total funds at his disposal and attempt to allocate them opt5_mally. 
Total funds available include funds gathered externally, denoted by 
C , and revenues gained through the program, P..X + ? X0. As capital 1 1 2 2 
and labor at service outlets will typically be similar we denote 
their costs per unit by r and w respectively. Administrative 
capital and labor will typically have different costs as these factors 
will represent different commodities and personnel, e.g., bureaucrats 
instead of doctors. Denote these costs per unit by s and y 
respectively. The budgetary restriction can then be expressed as: 
2.2.3) C + P1X1 + P2X2>r(k1 + k 2) + sBk + w d ^ + L ^ f y B^ 
3. Strict convexity with respect to price is an empirical 
question. If strict convexity is not maintained the equilibrium 
conditions yet to be derived will still be maintained at the optimum, 
however there will exist a set of suboptimum to choose from. 'Corner-
type solutions are plausible for this particular problem only 
if provision of one service is extremely inefficient and/or 
evaluation of this service is very low. Inter-connection of 
demand functions via prices is temporarily'eschewed until section 
2-3. 
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The optimization problem facing the central 
authority is thus to 
I) Maximize h(X ,X ) 
subject to 
xi = W W W 
X2 = f2(k2,L2,A2,Bk,BL;) 
X1 = W V 
X2 = d2(P2,A2) 
C + P X + P2X2>r(k1 + K ) + sBk + w(L +L) yB +. A + A . 
Xx,X2,kx,k2,L2,Bk,Bl,A1,A2>0. 
Problem (I) is equivalent to (assuming that a solution utilizing 
nonnegative factor quantities will be found): 
(II) Maximize h(XlSX„) 
subject to 
f1(k1,LlSA1,BkSB1) - Xx>0 
F2(k25L2,A2,Bk,BL) - X2>0 
W V 
W V -X 2>0 
C + P1X1 + P2X2 - r(k1 + k 2) - sBk - w(L2 + L2) - yB^ - A± - A2>0. 
From Problem. (II) we can immediately form the 
Lagrangian, -c£s the maximization of which yields our solution.. 
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2.2.4) f(X1,X2,K1,K2,L1,L2,BK,BL9AlSA29P1,P2iA1,X2,X3,Xu,X5) 
= MX 1 5X 2) ^ / " f J ^ . L ^ A ^ E ^ B ^ * Xi_~ 
+ A2/Tf2(K25L25A25BKSBL)- X2J 
+ x3/~d1(P1,A1) - x x_7 
T A„rd fP.,AJ - X- 7 
+ Xg/ C + P1X1 + P2X 2- r(Kx + K2) - S B K - wC^ + L 9 ) 
+Y(BL) - K - A2_7. 
Given an optimal distribution of resoruces, as will 
be subsequently determined from this Lagrangian3 the following 
interpretations are applicable to the respective Lagrangian multipliers. 
A ,X2 : The marginal value of an increase in output 
of the respective services or the marginal 
value of unitary increase "in technology of 
the respective services. 
AgjX^ : Private utility of the marginal individual 
using the alternative health services. 
Aj- : Marginal social value of an increase in 
subsidy funds. An overall optimal dis-
tribution within the context of government 
programs will equate this value with other 
projects funded by the government. 
The necessary first order conditions are therefore 
(assuming an interior solution): 
2.2.5) 3£ = 2h - A - Aq + P 1 = 0. 
3X 2X * 1 0 " 
2.2.6) 9£ = 2h - X - X + P L = 0 . 
2X2 2X2 
2.2.7) 9£ = X, 2fl 
2K7 V 
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2.2.8) 3£ 
3K 2K„ 
X5r" = 0. 
2.2.9) 
3L, 
A^ _w = 0 
2.2.10) _3£ 
3L„ C
2 
"3L 
9 
A w = 0 
5 
2.2.11) _3£ 
•3>B — 1-K 
X,8f2 + A * f 2 -
3B K ~3B K 
X S = 0 
2.2.12) _3£ 
3B 1 
, 3f , 3f A, 1 + A. 2 -
3Bt "3B K 
A5r = 0 
2.2.13) 3f 
3A, 
A- I t A„ 1 -
3A, 
a5 = 0 
2.2.14) 3£ 
BA, 
3f 3d„ A. 2 + A. 2 
3A, 
= 0 
2.2.15) 
2.2.16) 
3£ 
3P} 
3£ 
3P. 
A.3dl + A X 
°3P1 
C 2 3P 
5 1 
X5X2 
= 0 
= 0 
2 
2.2.17) 3£ = f - X = 0 
3A-, 1 
2.2.18) 3£ = f - X = 0 . 
3X2 
2.2.19) 3£ = d - X = 0 . 
3A3 
2.2.20) 3£ = d - X = 0 . 
2.2.21) 3f = C+P1X1+P2X2-r(K1+K2)-SBK-w(L +L2) 
3X5 
-ybk-a1-a2 = 0 
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Interpretation of equations (2.2.17) • ' 
through (2.2.21) can be made directly. Equations (2.2.17) and 
(2.2.18) state that it is optimal to utilise your productive 
processes efficiently and that the supply curve is the production 
function. Equations (2.2.19) and (2.2.20) state that it is optimal 
for the administering authority to charge a price in accordance with 
demand conditions. Specifically a price should always be charged so 
that there is no excess demand or supply condition present in either 
of the services being offerred. While seemingly an obvious condition 
many public service facilities charge negligible if any fees for 
heavily demanded services resulting in long queues and excess demand. 
Such conditions represent suboptimal behaviour. Equation (2-2.21) 
states that all funds and revenues accrued should be spent. 
Rearranging equations (2.2.7) (2.2.8), (2.2.9) and 
(2.2.10) we have 
2.2.22) Xn 3f. 1 = r . 
X5 9kl 
2.2.23) X„ 3f, 
X5 9k2 
2.2.24) X !fl = w 
2.2.25) X2 ^ 2 - w . 
X5 9k2 
These equations imply that 
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2.2.26) Sfi 
= r for i = 1,2 . 
9f. w l 
9L. l 
The ratio of marginal factor products should be equal 
to the ratio of factor prices. 
Equivalently defining g^ as factor gain 
2.2.27) r w 
9f. = 3fi for i = 1,2 . 
9k: 3Li l 
process. 
Factor gain should be equalized within a productive 
From equations (2.2.7) and (2.2.8) 
2.2.28) A1 = g. X5 , 
2.2.29) X2 = g2 X5 . 
and from equations (2.2.15) and (2.2.16) 
- y 
2.2.30) X3 = 3d., X5 , 
-X2 
2.2.31) X, = 3d. Xr 4 2 5 . 
9P2 : ,.. ... 
Substituting equations (2.2.28), (2.2.29), (2.2.30) 
and (2.2.31) into equations (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) we obtaining 
/ \ 2.2.32) - gxX5 - | 3dx |X5 + PXX5 = 0 
\ 5 . / 
which implies 
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X ; 1 
; 3d « -L 
2.2.33) P - g - \ W ~ ' 
- ± _ £ _ 3h Ac 
3X1 
Similarly we obtain 
2.2.34) P - g - | 3d ! 
z \ — - ( 
\ 2 1 
3h A 
sx2 
Combining equations (2.2.33) and (2.2.34) we obtain 
2.2.35) 
2-2.35) Px " - | M^J ? 2 " §2 ^ j 
\ 9 P ! / = \ 9 P2 
3b 3h 
3X 3X„ 1 / 
Optimal production requires that the price minus 
factor gain minus the elasticity of demand all divided by marginal 
utility be equalized for the two services. 
Substituting equations (2.2.28), (2.2.29), (2.2.30) 
and > (2.2.31) into equations (2.2.13) and (2.2.14): 
/ -X \ 
2.2.36) G L + ; IDFI X 5 - X 5 = ° 
1 rTi dRi 
and 
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2.2.37) g2X5 3A2 + ^ 2 X5 
3P. 
3d, 
3A" 
- * 0 
Noting 3f^ _ q ^ _ ^ ^ ancj eliminating X,_ • 
o 3A. l 
2.2.38) 3d. x 
3P. 3d. _ i . .. i for l = 1,2. 
X. 3A. l l 
Thus optimal resources allocation implies that the 
elasticity of demand for either service in equilibrium equals the inverse 
of the marginal increase in demand arising from advertising expenditure. 
Substituting equations (2.2.28) and (2.2.29) into 
equations (2.2.11) and (2.2.12) while eliminating . X : 5 
9fl 
2.2.39) g + 2 - S = 0 and 
3BL § 2 3 B k 
! f i 
2.2.40) g ^ + g 2 l / . . - V = 0 . 
L 
Rewriting: 
3fl 3f 2.2.41) g +; 2 = s 
1 3Bk 2 33~ k 
and 
2.2.42) 3fl 3f2 
313B L 
+ % 
Optimal resource allocation requires that the sum 
of joint factor processes times factor gain be set equal to joint 
factor cost. 
This exhausts the comparative statics (excluding the 
X.) of this model. x 
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2.3) A Two-Service Model with Interdependent Demands 
The problem considered in this section is identical to 
that considered in the previous section, except now we allow 
interdependencies of demand. Typically an administrator in a 
public service program will be allocating a spectrum of services - . 
which are highly interdependent. 
In a family planning prpgram an increase in price charged 
for prenatal care would presumably increase demand for contraceptives. 
In a road maintenance program an increase in tolls on one trunk route 
into a metropolitan area would presumably increase demand on other 
like trunk routes. 
Utilizing the same definitions and assumptions as in the 
previous section the demand functions formerly represented by 
equations (2.2.2. ) are changed to 
2.3.1) X. = d.(P.,P.,A.) for i,j = 1,2, i 1 j . l 1 1 3 1 
: AD. • - ' 
Here 9d. < 0 , -7-^ > 0 . 1 oil, 
. . 3PT : r . ' •"••• ' • • 1 • 
In general it does not seem reasonable to place any conditions 
on the signs of as the services offered may be 
w . 
D , 
either complements or substitutes in consumption. However in 
an individual application ..it might be reasonable to 
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infer some prior sign to these derivatives. 
The optimization problem facing the administrating 
authority is thus to; 
(III) Maximize h ^ , ^ ) 
subject to 
h = : f i < V 
X2 = f2(^K2'L2'A2'BK'BL^ 
h = V P1' P2' A1> 
= ?Pp}Ap) 
C = + P ^ + P2X2>_r(lLL+K2) + s3K + W(L1+L2) + y + + i 
Assuming an interior solution problem (ill) is equivalent to 
(17) Maximize h(X.,X2) 
subject to 
fl<h>hih'\'*l) ~ X1 - ° 
f2(K2,L2.,A2,3K,BL) - X 2 > 0 
d1(P1,P2,A1) - Xx > 0 
d2(P1?P2fA2) - ^ > 0 
G + P ^ + P2X2 - r(!LL+K2) - s3K - + L2) - y3^ - A ± - A2 > 0. 
The Lagrangian is; 
15 -
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2.3.2) £ = h(XlfX2) + V V Y Y V V V - X ± J 
+ a2/?2(K2,L23A2,Bk,Bl) - X2_7 
+ A3/d1(PrP2,A1) -X x_7 
+ V V Y V V " X2-7 
+ A 5/C + P1X1 + P2X2 - r(Ki+K2) 
- sBk - W(L1+L2) - VBl - A1 - A2_7. 
The interpretations of the lagrangian multipliers are identical 
to those given in section 2.2. 
The necessary first order conditions are therefore: 
2.3.3) 2£ = ah _ _ _ 
3Xn SX1 A1 3 + 1 5 u-
2.3.4) 2£ = £h _ 
9X. W - 2 ~ 4 2 5 " 0 
2.3.5) 3£ - A,3f, - A5r = 0. — 1 x ° 3K 
1 3K, 
2.3.6) _ A2^f2 - Aj_r = 0. 
3K -fr, 2 K2 
2"3-7) # = V f l - A w = 0. 
9L1 ^ 5 
2.3.3) 3£ = = o. 
2 % 5 
2-3-9) 3£ - + A 0^2 - A5S = 0. 
K 3BK " K 
2.3.10) A£ _ A & -AE IE" - 1 £ + A 0 £ l- ij Li 
2.3.II) .3£ _ , 3f, A 3d _ A _ _ 
3A ~ 1- ° _ 3 ~ i 3A 1 
2.3.12) = A 2 A F 2 + X A D 2 _ 0 . 
9 2 w 2 "saT 5 
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2.3.13) |£ = X33^ + X43d2 + 
a 1 §P1 3PX 5 1 
2.3.14) g£ _ X 3'd ^ X(,3d2 + XCX ' 
'^p ~ d 1 + • • 5 2 - - 0. 
8 P2 SP^ 9 ? 2 
2.3.15) U _ _ 
3Xn " fl X1 " 
2.3.16) U _ f 2 - X2 = 0. 
X2 
2.3.17) 3£ d - X = 0. 
3X3 1 
2.3.18) 3£ _ d_ " X = 0. 
3X4 ~ • 2 
2.3.19) 3£ _ 
3X_ - D 
3X_ " C + P l V P2X2 " r(K1+K2)-sBK-w(L1+L2)-vBL-A;L-A2 = 0. 
The interpretation of equations (2.3.15) through (2.3.19) is 
-id-ant-ical- to- that given for equations { 2 . ) through (2.2.21). 
Equations (2.3.5) through (2.3:8) reduce to the same equilibrium 
condition as equation (2.2.26). Defining g^ as in equation (2.2.27) the 
effect of price interdependency is felt in each of the remaining optimality 
conditions. 
Equating and then rearranging equations (2.3.13) and (2.3.14) 
we find: . ,-
t 
1 2 1 d a2\ 
X, X0 9P 2.3.20) V . " ! 2 d r2/ 
l3 " . , 3d, , 3d, x 4 
{X 1 •3P1 X2 aP2 J 
- d X^ ; defining d » 
or 
2.3.21) X, = X3 
4 d 
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1.3.22) 
2.3.23) 
Substituting back into equation (2.3*13): 
"r 
X3 = ...7^... x5 
5dl 1 
x 4 " ^ 2 a 5 
9 d 2 , i W 
3?o d 3?0 
Substituting equations (2,2,20), (2.2.29),. (2.3,-.22), 
and ( 2 . 3 . 2 3 ) into equations ( 2 . 3 . 3 ) and ( 2 . 3 . 4 )» simplifying and then 
equating we obtain as an equilibrium condition 
2.3»24) 1 • •• ' • " • ' " Xi X2 
P-. - g-, • rs — rr—- Pn - R 1 &1 3d 3d 2 to2 ad0 3d 1 1 2 . — — + 1 X 
3P1 . d V ' ^2 d 
Si 3h 
3XX %.X2 
This equation can be compared directly with that correspondingly 
obtained in the independence of demand case, ecu-it ion (2.2.35). The 
difference enters into the third-term in the numerator). As the cross partial? 
approach zero the limit is clearly ecuation (2.2.35). .p1 3?n 3P, 
Noting 9f. substituting equations (2.3.22) and 
1 = 0 , 3A. 
( 2 . 3 . 2 3 ) into equations ( 2 . 3 . 1 1 ) and ( 2 . 3 . 1 2 ) and rearranging 
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we obtain as optimality conditions 
M 1 1 * " 3d, —rr + '1 3?-, 3d -. 3P. 
3A-, = 1 
and 
2.3.26) ' ' 3d2 3d1 
• - id • 2 r> ' + a 3 a2 3 -2 
3A2 .. X2 
Optimality conditions regarding joint factors of 
production are identical to those obtained in the independence 
of demand case5 i.e. , equations (2.21,41) and (2.2.42). 
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2.4) A Multiple—Service Model 
This section consider? a multiple service modelp where 
there can be many unifunctional and joint factors of production 
as well as the possibility of advertising for each of the services. 
As long as the demand equations are strictly independent of one another 
optimality conditions are directly analagous with those derived for the 
Two-Service Model of section 2.2. TjJhen demand interdependences are 
allowed in a multiple—service model the complications involve are 
generalizations to those encountered in the Two—Service Model with Demand 
Interdependence as in Section 2„3» A generalization to a multiple-service 
model with demand interdependences' is found" in" section 2.5. 
Let ,X be measures of the service outputs with 
corresponding convex production functions f j ,.. o, f^ where the 
unifunctional factors of production (having positive marginal products) 
are y-^-^?'0000 '^ip'^Pi' •0 0 0 ? 3,7"^ pS ° ° ° ?^jji'000 yX^p? joint factors of 
production are anc1 advertising expenditures A,,.....A » 1' ' n 0 1' ' n 
Respective prices of outputs are , of univariate factors are 
,r , and of joint factors ire yc.. Demand for X^is given 
by di(Pi,Ai) i = lf0...?n. 
Assuming a convex utility function, h(X^,....,X ), the 
optimization problem facing the central authority is 
- 21 - Ibb/WP 249 
thus to 
(?) Maximize. h ^ , .•.... fX ) 
to; 
2.4.1) 
subject to 
\ = o o o o j .. o « y - . d = l , . . . . , n . 
X. = d.(P.,,A.) v i = 1,•••».. vn. -l iv iJ ® 9
_ . n ,r . n p c n . 
° + * PiXi ^  . * . ? r f dj + r k3k + S A 
i=l i=l j=l . -•.. k=l i=l 
Xi,yij» VAi 1° -1- n ^ 31 PS 11 k< n. 
Assuming-an interior solution problem (?) is""'e'cii£valent 
(VI) Maximize h (X^,..», X ) 
subject to 5 . ...... 
d. (P.,A.) - X. = 0 vi=lt«>«co,n i' iJ iy i ' 
n n p . o n 
•c + i i i ^ i - ili j=i rj i j -kl i ¥ k - M l 
The corresponding Lagrangian is; 
n 
£= h(X1,.o..JXn) + J=1 Xi j fi(yill....,yip,i51,....fzqfAi) - X± 
n 
+ . 
+ P±x.- 1=1 r.y 
q n 
I "Y <7. — S ft 
k=l k k i=l i j 
- 22 .-
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The necessary first order condition? re therefore; 
2*4'2> -fr • "H:—h"i V T1 - » • 
3f 2«4»3) = _ = o Vi=lf o ... ,n and 
37ij 1 3vi.i J 
J=1y O O O O jP o 
2.4.4) = V i " erk = OYk=l,....,q 
k i=l k 
2.4.5) 3£ 
3A. > JtL. ^ L ~ i 3:1. + "i 3A. l i 
- 6 = 0 Vl=lc O O O O 9 n o 
2.4.6) 
2.4.7) 
2.4. S) 
2.4=9) 
3£ 
3P. 
3£ 
3£ 
3£ 
3 3 
3d. 
= • ' + 3X. = 0 Vi=l,....,n o 1 o ± • 1 
f. - X. = 0 1 1 
d. - X. = 0 1 1 
i — ZL J 0 O O 6 J 11 O 
i—1 y O O © O y II 
n p n 
= C + . V l A i - -E-i r.y. . - r. z. - .S_A. i=l i=l j=l .] i,] k=l k k i=l i 
Interpretation of equations (2.4.7) is that it is optimal to 
produce efficiently and that the supply curves are the production functions, 
of equations (2.4.8) is that prices of services should; be equal to demand 
conditions, and. of equations (2.4.9) that all resources received should 
be spent. 
Rearranging equations (2.4.3); 
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2.4.10) 
r. . 1 • -1 
0 ' V—=-*-,.... j n 5 
k J=1, o . o . , U 5 
k=lj : o a o jC a 
The ratio of marginal factor products should be ecual to the 
ratio of factor prices. 
Factor gain, g. , is defined as 
2.4.11) ri . . 
af. g = ^ ^ o ¥1=1,.. d e o jP p 
3X^ V-J =1, o o o. ,n o 
Factor gain should be equalized vithin a productive process. 
Rcom ecuations ( 2 . 4 . 3 ) ; 
2.4.12) xi = g^B ¥i=l,....,n . 
From equations (2.4.6); 
2.4.13) 
-.ax. i 
™ 9 d ~ g . ¥i=l, 
9P. 0 1 
Substituting equations (2.4.12) and (2.4,13) and rearranging 
in a manner similar to the derivation of ecuation (2.2.35) >re finds 
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2.4.14) x± • X. 
1 E T ITi 
_ 3.h _ 
8 1 d M 
i, j ,i=l,.... ,n ? i f 
Optimal production recuires that-price minus factor gain 
minus elasticity all divided by marginal utility be equated for all services. 
Noting 2f. eliminating 6 , and i . = 0 ¥i=l,.. o o, n , 
2k. 
rear-ranging from equations (2.4.5) ° 
2.4.15) 3d. X 1 
3 P. = -3d-. 1 X 
3 4 x X 
. J O O O J' 
or 
3d. 3d. 1 o 1 _ -., 
3?± 3Ai ~ i 
The partial derivatives of the demand curve with respect to price and 
advertising when multiplied should equal output. 
Using the concept of factor gains in eruptions 2.4.4)9 17e find: 
2.4.16) ?! 9£i_ 
i=l % 3Zi = Yj 0 
- 2 5 -
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Optimality requires that the sum of factor gains tines joint 
factor marginal physical products should be set equal to joint factor 
COST. • ; 
As can be readily seen these optiimlit};- conditions are 'direct 
generalizations of those in the two service model considered in Section 2.2. 
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2.5) ?faltiple~3_e^ ;ice Hodsl_j^t!^J^nnnd interdependence 
The model econsidered here is identical to that analyzed 
in Section 2.4 except interdependence of demand is included. The 
results derived here -ire the multivariate extensions of analysis 
undertaken in Section 2.3. Definitions and assumptions are identical 
to those undertaken in the previous section excepting demand for X. 
is given by d.(P1?.... »P ,A.) for all i=l,oooo,n . x x n 1 
The optimisation problem is thens 
(VII) Maximize h f ; ^ X ) 
subject to 
\.\V«-IQOOOOO,Y. O /J-i O O © © C -<LI O ?. . . 1 xl ' xp' 1 0/ 1' X — X (  .Y. Y ZJ ,000. Z^ Y ' VI—1 Y O O E . P N 
Y - ,-1 (p p A 
x x 1 n x .n 
• En P.X. > ? r.y. . + j , :Yl z. + A. L=1 x x — I-I .1=1 ,YI.l k=l Yk k 1=1 x 
X. ,y. »A. > 0 VI.; i< n ? 1 . .1 •• r> t 1 k - c . x7" x.i1 k' 1 — — 5 • "* - • 
Assuming an interior solutions Problem ("I) is erui-ralent 
'COS 
Maximize ) 
subject to% 
f- (y.-. 90000 0 'Zi- 700000!^  aj\m) <(.. = 0 vi=l« o o o 0 o ii o x wxl ! lp 1 q 1 1 
rl f ^ P 1 ) _ y - n iz-i _ 1 -n U- . ^ •- -. j . o o o j f '. . J ™ .i>. • — w v^ -L -_L y o o o e y -i o 1 1 II X X 
n n p Q. „ n , j. --- C- t< -tr — T" 3 — - O 0 + i=i % - i-i A 513 k=lk k lii*1 
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The corresponding Lagrangian is: 
n 
2.0.1) £ = h(x1,....,xn) x. / fi(yil,...-.,yip,z1,....,2qAi)-xiJ 
^ " i A 1 ! V ~ V - 7 
n n P 4 n 
+ 3 (C + E P.X. - E E r.Y. . - L vz, - E A. ) 
i=l 1 1 i=l.j=l D 13 k = 1 k k ,i=l 1 
The necessary first order conditions are therefore: 
2.5.2) 35 = 3h - X. - + P.33 = 0 for all i=l, ,n . 
3X. 9X. 1 1 1 i l 
9 f 2.5.3) d£_ = X. i - Br. = 0 for all i=ls ,n and 
9y. . 1 3y. . 3 j=l, ,P • 13 13 
n 9f. 
2.5.4) 3£ = EX. -r-i- - BY, = 0 for all k=l,....,q . 
3z. i=l 1 3zk k k 
3d. 
2.5.5) 3£ = X. 3f + « ^ " 3 - 0 for all i=l, ,n . — — 1 — - . DA. 3A. 3A. 1 1 1 1 
n 3d. 
2.5.6) 3£ = E + 3 X. = 0 for all i=l, ,n . 
3P. j=l 3 9Fi 1 
2.5.7) 3£ = f. - X. = 0 for all i=l, n . 
3X7 1 1 1 
2.5.8) it. = d. - X. = 0 for all'i=l, n . 
3^7 
1 
n n P q n 
2.5.9) 3£ = C + E P.X - E E r.1 . - E y z - E A 
3 T i=l 1 " 1=1 3=1 D ^ ^=1 k k i=l 1 
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Interpretation of equations (2.5.7), ( 2.5.8), and (2.5.9) 
are identical to those of equations (2.4.7), (2.L.8) and (2.4.9)° 
Rearranging ecuxtions (2.5.3) rod ( 2 . 5 . 4 ) yields conclusions 
identical to equations (2.4.10) and (2.4.16) respectively. Interdependence 
of demand does not affect the equilibrium conditions of both unifunctional 
and ,i»int factors of production. 
I^om equations (2.5.6) we can find the « ^  as functions of 3 
Ntiting out equations (2.5.6)? 
,5.10) 2 dl 2 dl 
1 + + cc n ZP^ = BS, 
2dl 2 dl 
l W + 0000 +cc n W n n 
= 3X, n 
Dividing the ith equation by X^ , for all i=l,«...fn yields; 
2.5.11) n 2dn n 2d 1 1 a _ _ n 
X1 2 P1 + °°00 + n X1 2 P1 
n 
2d. 
2P~ + 0'00+"eE n X, 
n 
' n. 
Eouations (2.5.11) can be written in matrix form ass 
2.5.12) 1 
-r 
1 
2CL, 
2P, 
, <ca ! I O n 
X 2P 1 rl 1, 
1 2d, 
n <tjr o o o • n 
n. 
IX 2P j .:- n n • n > 
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which is ecuivalent to 
2.5.13) Fa =g;> , this defining Fnxn/' cnxl , and 
* nxl 
Assuming F has an inverse then 
-1 * 
2 . 5 . 1 4 ) « = f - e 
and 
11 •? ^ ~ 1 O 
2.5.15) • i ^n-'ij] 6 
n - _ 1 
= 8 F TP. . • 
7 = 1 
„ -1 = gF. 
defining FT"'" as the ith row sum. to l 
Substituting ecuation (2.5.15) and defining g^ 
as in equations (2.4.12) and also substituting into equations 
(2.5.2); 
2.5.16) 3h „ . 
32 x 
- s.g ~ g + P^g = 0 for all i=l,....,n . 
2.5.17) 
Equations (2.5.16) imply that under optimal allocations 
n - a _ P _ a -?i i = " .1 bj - 3 for all 1,3=1, 
o O O O y n y J < 
2h 2h 
- 30 
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Advertising expenditures are also affected by interdependence 
of demand conditions. Noting 2£ 
2 A = 0 
1 
for all i=l,»».,,n and substituting into equations (2.5.5) from (2.5 .15)1 
2.5.18) -1 3 d. 
3 A. 
which implies the optimality condition - ,'• . 
2.5.19) 3 d. 1 
3A± f~1 . ' 
•Similarly optimal price -ire affected by interdependence of 
demand. Substituting ecuations (2.5.15) into equations (2.5.6); 
2.5.20) n -1 3d, 
j ^D -^ + SX. = 0 for all i=l,....,n . J--L a'± 1 
which implies 
2.5.21) X. = - j FT1 for all i=l,....,n . 
1 j=l 3 3?. 
. Equations 2.5.21 exhaust-the comparative statics of * 
multiservice allocation under demand interdependence. Interdependence 
of demand for services does not affect factor demands. However the optim 
prices-charged, advertising expenditures and quantities offered are most 
definitely affected as can be seen by equation systems (2.5.17), (2.5.19) 
and (2.5.21)5 moreover the overall effect upon any single variable of 
demand interdependence"is not "obvious*, as the.matrix inverse F ' needs 
to be computed, which in itself is dependent upon optimal outputs and 
partial derivatives of demand with respect to prices. 
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Conclusions 
As can readily be ascertained the only similarity between 
optimality conditions of a typical government organization and a 
profit maximizing firm both providing several services or products 
is that the ratio of marginal factor products should be equal to the 
ratio of factor prices for unifunctional factors. The remaining 
optimality conditions facing the administrator of a public service program 
are entirely unique to his own individual administrative task. These have 
been derived in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. Such conditions also are far 
from intuitively obvious. A question which can be readily asked is whether 
any such organization will, as a natural consequence of administrative 
decisions, tend to .gravitate towards an optimal productive organization? 
Whereas in market competition natural market forces, as a conseouence 
of resulting profits and losses, will tend to select and have remaining 
profit maximizing firms satisfying the necessary optimality conditions 
for profit maximization such a motivational and selective process seems 
to be almost entirely lacking in the case of a multiple service 
providing agency. Beyond exhortations to individual workers to accomplish 
more in their duties 'obvious' indicators towards improvement, capable of 
administrative recognition and action, seem to be entirely lacking. Also 
natural selection is rarely at work, especially for public services 
(the chance of a government supplied service being eliminated is rather 
small in most societies), because typically either legislative acts 
prevent competition (which in the long run could be expected to direct 
provision of these services to profit maximization) or else market 
conditions simply preclude competitive firms being profitable. 
Given a situation where optimality of operations is unlikely 
to be met spontaneously through either market forces or administrative 
decree what can be done to improve the allocative process? It appears 
necessary to approach optimality econometric investigation must first 
be made into the relevant supply and demand relations for these services 
and subsequently optimality conditions regarding resource purchase and 
use, outputs prices, and distributions of outputs be imposed by admini-
strative decree upon the organization. 
The unlikelihood of a public service industry operating 
efficiently due to ignorance of optimality conditions covering operations 
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can be used to account in part for the apparently lower statistical 
productivity of employees in the public sector as compared to those 
in the private sector. Also it can be used to explain a lower rate 
of technical progress in the public sector as opposed to the private 
sector| it is difficult to achieve progress when explicit goals in 
terms of optimality conditions are difficult to ascertain and 
achieve. 
The concept of factor gains, the ratio of specific factor 
costs to marginal factor productivity, for each of the productive 
processes plays an extremely important part in the optimality 
conditions. In a profit maximization context under perfect competition, 
factor gains should optimally be one for all factors and productive 
processes. This corresponds to all firms operating at the minimum 
point on their long—run U—shaped average cost curves where the 
production function is homogeneous of degree one. From a socialistic 
context this condition on individual service units is lacking, and 
instructions to service units to operate in such a manner will result 
in suboptimal behavior. Optimal socialistic behavior implies that 
service units will typically operate at capacities where the production 
function is not homogeneous of degree one. A.s such the sum of value 
marginal products wi.ll not add up to the value of services 5 implying 
that some factors must necessarily be 'exploited". Satisfaction of 
the optimality conditions stated in this analysis however results in 
exploitation of factors in favor of the public good. 
